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ABSTRACT 
Thefts were staged for pairs of witnesses who were subsequently given a photo-lineup 
from which to identify the thief Individual witnesses (N= 159) were asked by a uniformed 
security officer to make an identification from either a perpetrator-present or perpetrator-
absent lineup. Witnesses who made an identification (n = 122) were randomly assigned to 
receive either no information, or one of two types of extra-memorial information: (a) the co-
witness had identified the same person from the photospread, or (b) the identified suspect had 
prior criminal involvement. The officer then asked witnesses to make confidence judgments 
and ecphoric similarity judgments (i.e., perceived resemblance of the witness's memory of the 
perpetrator to the identified suspect). Analyses were conducted on a subsample of witnesses 
(n = 96) selected such that all conditions contained the same proportion of witnesses who had 
viewed each of the three confederate thieves. Extra-memorial information was expected to 
inflate Avitnesses' confidence judgments but not their ecphoric judgments. Results indicated 
that prior-involvement information inflated the confidence of inaccurate witnesses, but not 
that of accurate witnesses relative to witnesses in the control condition. Co-witness 
information did not significantly inflate confidence for either accurate or inaccurate witnesses 
relative to control witnesses. Contrary to predictions, extra-memorial information had the 
same effect on witnesses' ecphoric similarity judgments as it did on their confidence 
judgments. Two-thirds of the witnesses who received extra-memorial information indicated 
that they relied on that information when making their confidence judgments, but there was no 
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evidence that witnesses were able to accurately estimate the degree to which their confidence 
judgments were actually affected. Eyewitness confidence judgments can be problematic 
because they are susceptible to inflation effects due to witnesses' exposure to extra-memorial 
information. Unfortunately, ecphoric judgments are also susceptible to the same inflation 
effects. These findings highlight the critical importance of two characteristics of a properly 
conducted lineup. First, the person who conducts the lineup should not know which person in 
the lineup is the suspect. Second, confidence and similarity judgments should be secured from 
the witness at the time of the identification, prior to the introduction of any extra-memorial 
information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Eyewitness testimony is crucial in a large number of trials conducted in the United 
States. One estimate suggests that eyewitness identification evidence is the only critical 
evidence in 77,000 cases in the United States each year (Goldstein, Chance, & Schneller, 
1989). Although eyewitness testimony is invaluable and irreplaceable in the criminal justice 
system, it can have dire consequences when an eyewitness makes an error. In fact, eyewitness 
error is the single largest factor leading to false convictions in the United States (Borchard, 
1932; Brandon & Davies, 1973; Frank & Frank, 1957; Huflf, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986; 
Rattner, 1988). 
It is not the occurrence of a false identification per se that poses a problem for the 
courts. Rather, it is the occurrence of a false identification by a highly confident witness that 
creates a special problem (Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). An eyewitness who testifies in 
court that he or she is "uncertain" about his or her identification is unlikely to be given much 
evidentiary weight (Wells & Murray, 1983). On the other hand, the sincerely confident yet 
inaccurate witness who says "I am completely confident that I have identified the right person" 
is likely to be believed by the trier-of-fact (judge or jury). The testimony of a highly confident 
witness who has made a false identification may ultimately result in the conviction of an 
innocent person. 
The term confidence in the eyewitness identification literature generally refers to the 
degree to which the eyewitness believes that he or she made an accurate identification (i.e.. 
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identified the guilty person). The crucial role that eyewitness confidence plays in people's 
determinations of eyewitness accuracy has been examined in surveys of potential jurors, and 
demonstrated in several experimental studies. Surveys of college students and of potential 
jurors indicate that people believe that confidence is an important indicator of eyewitness 
accuracy (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Kassin & Bamdollar, 1992; Lindsay, 1994). As a result 
of this belief, witnesses who make false identifications with a high degree of confidence are 
likely to be more persuasive and have more impact in the courtroom than are less confident 
witnesses. 
The prominent role that eyewitness confidence can play in the courtroom has been 
demonstrated in experimental studies using a mock trial setting. In one study, participants 
viewed a version of a videotaped armed robbery trial in which ten factors that had previously 
been shown to affect identification accuracy (e.g., retention interval, lineup instructions) were 
manipulated (Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988). Eyewitness confidence was the only factor 
manipulated in the study that affected mock jurors' estimate of the likelihood that an 
identification was accurate. The more confident that the witness was, the greater the perceived 
likelihood that the vsatness was accurate. 
Eyewitness confidence does more than just affect the degree to which a person 
believes that the eyewitness is accurate. Interestingly, a witness's confidence in his or her 
identification affects how people evaluate other aspects of the witness's testimony. 
When people evaluated the testimony of witnesses who were not very confident, they used 
situational information (e.g., opportunity of the witness to view the culprit, amount of time the 
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culprit was in view of the witness) more appropriately than people who evaluated the 
testimony of highly confident witnesses (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). It would seem that 
people become more sensitive to factors that can be relevant to the determination of 
eyewitness accuracy (e.g., the eyewitness's opportunity to view the culprit) when they have 
reason to question the accuracy of the eyewitness. 
The lay person's belief in the reliability of eyewitness confidence as an indicator of 
eyewitness accuracy is reflected in the guidelines forjudging eyewitness identification 
evidence that have been proposed by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
suggests that the confidence of the Avitness should be considered when determining the 
likelihood that an identification is accurate (Neil v. Biggers^ 1972). However, eyewitness 
research does not support the idea that confidence is a strong indicator of eyewitness 
accuracy. The most recent meta-analysis examining the confidence-accuracy relation indicates 
that eyewitness confidence accounts for about 6% of the variance in identification accuracy (r 
= .25; Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987). Although the magnitude of the correlation 
is between a small and medium effect according to Cohen's conventional values for the social 
sciences (1988), it has veiy limited practical value. Previous examinations of the relation were 
no more encouraging (Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980; Wells & Murray, 1984). 
The trier-of-fact who holds a belief that confident witnesses tend to be correct will 
have difficulty distinguishing a false identification from an accurate one. In fact, research has 
shown that people are generally unable to distinguish accurate fiom inaccurate eyewitnesses. 
Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson (1979) videotaped the testimony of eyeAvitnesses to a staged 
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theft, and then presented the testimony to mock jurors. Jurors believed a majority of both 
accurate and inaccurate witnesses, and the jurors were unable to determine wliich of the 
witnesses were accurate. Throughout a series of similar studies, the expressed confidence of 
an eyewitness has consistently been a significant predictor of observers' beliefs in eyewitness 
accuracy (Lindsay, Wells, & O'Connor, 1989; Lindsay et al., 1981; Wells, Ferguson, & 
Lindsay, 1981; Wells et al., 1979; Wells, Lindsay, & Tousignant, 1980). 
The expectation that eyewitness confidence and accuracy are related is derived from 
the belief that a witness who says that he or she is confident is making a statement comparable 
to "my memory of the culprit is so close to the appearance of the suspect that I believe they 
are the same person". If confidence is affected by factors that are not related to how good the 
witness's memory is, then the expectation is no longer warranted. Leippe (1980) discussed in 
detail how wdtness accuracy and witness confidence can be affected independently. Leippe 
argued that reconstructive memory processes can affect memory but not confidence, whereas 
suggestive social influences can affect confidence but not accuracy. If eyewitness confidence is 
not solely a function of accuracy or factors that influence accuracy, one should not always 
expect there to be a significant confidence-accuracy relation. 
In the years since Leippe (1980) outlined this provocative framework, only two 
experimental studies have demonstrated the malleability of confidence independently of 
accuracy. In the first of these, witnesses to a staged crime were cross-examined about their 
memories for the event (Wells et al., 1981). Half of the witnesses were briefed prior to the 
cross-examination about the tjqies of questions that would be asked, and witnesses were 
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encouraged to think about their answers. Overall, witnesses who had been briefed rated 
themselves as significantly more confident than did witnesses who had not been briefed. 
Mock jurors who watched \ddeotaped cross-examinations also rated the briefed witnesses as 
more confident than the witnesses who had not been briefed. The briefing procedure increased 
only the reported confidence of the inaccurate witnesses and thereby increased the likelihood 
that jurors would accept inaccurate testimony as fact. Briefing the eyewitnesses effectively 
eliminated the usefulness of eyewitness confidence as an indicator of eyewitness accuracy. 
In the only other study of confidence malleability, Luus and Wells (1994) investigated 
the effect of social influence on eyewitness confidence through the mampulation of co-witness 
information. Following a staged crime, A\ntnesses who made an identification were given 
information about a co-witness's identification decision. Eyewitness accuracy was held 
constant by having all the witnesses in the study make an identification from a lineup that did 
not contain the actual culprit, rendering any identification inaccurate. After eyewitnesses made 
an identification (97% of eyewitnesses identified someone from a set of photographs) and 
received information about a co-witness's identification decision, they were asked to indicate 
how confident they were in their identification. Information about a co-witness's identification 
had a strong effect on eyewitness confidence. Compared to a control group of witnesses who 
were given no information about the co-witness's behavior, witnesses who were told that the 
co-witness identified the same person as they did were more confident in their identifications. 
This increase in confidence persevered even when witnesses were later told that the co-
witness had actually identified someone else, or when the co-witness information was 
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withdrawn altogether. A decrease in confidence occurred for witnesses who were told that the 
co-witness did not identify anyone fi-om the photospread, or who were told that the co-
witness had identified a different person. The confidence deflation effect persevered even 
when those witnesses were later told that the co-witness had actually identified the same 
person that they had identified. Witnesses who were told that the co-witness identified an 
implausible person fi'om the lineup showed an increase in confidence compared to witnesses in 
the control group. The only witnesses whose confidence did not differ fi'om the no-
information control group were those who had been told that the co-witness had identified a 
different person and then later told that the information was inaccurate. In general, co-witness 
agreement led to an increase in eyewitness confidence, and any discrepancy between the co-
witness's identification decision and the eyewitness's own decision led to a decrease in 
confidence (Luus & Wells, 1994). Levels of eyewitness confidence were both raised and 
lowered by the manipulation of co-witness information after the witness made an 
identification. 
It is clear that eyewitness confidence is not merely a function of the accuracy of an 
eyewitness's memory. As Leippe (1980) suggested, confidence can be influenced by social 
(and non-memorial) variables, such as another witness's beliefs about the identity of the 
suspect. If the witnesses in Luus and Wells' (1994) study based their confidence judgments on 
their memories for the event alone, the behavior of the co-witness would not have affected 
their levels of confidence. Hence, the confidence of the eyewitness can be considered a 
function of both memorial and non-memorial influences. 
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Non-memorial factors can influence the eyewitness's confidence when the witness 
considers factors other than absolute similarity (between the identified suspect and the 
witness's memory of the culprit) when making a confidence judgment. There are innumerable 
factors other than similarity that might affect the degree to which a witness is confident in his 
or her identification. For example, eyewitness confidence might be based upon a relative 
similarity judgment. That is, the witness might be confident not because the identified suspect 
greatly resembled the witness's memory of the culprit, but rather because the identified suspect 
looked more like the culprit than did the other lineup members (Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 
1993). Eyewitness confidence might also be based upon the ease or speed with which the 
Avitness was able to make the identification (Sporer, 1992). The witness who experienced the 
suspect "standing out" fi-om the lineup during the identification might feel more confident than 
the witness who had to examine each lineup member carefully before being able to make a 
decision. As a final example, confidence could be based upon the degree to which the witness 
believed that the identified suspect was guilty. 
A belief in the guilt of the suspect might be affected by a number of factors, including 
information about another eyewitness's behavior or a statement fi-om a police officer regarding 
other evidence for or against the accused. Even the simple fact that the witness was called into 
court to testify might suggest to the witness that he or she had identified at least a plausible 
suspect fi-om the lineup. The conclusion that the Avitness had identified "the right one" could 
increase the witness's level of confidence. Confidence, in such an example, is not exclusively a 
statement about how much an identified suspect resembles the culprit, but is also a statement 
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about how much the witness believes that the person identified is guilty. 
From the perspective of a juror, however, the certainty with which an eyewitness 
testifies may seem only to be a statement about the reliability of the eyewitness's memory. The 
witness does not testify as to why he or she is certain, except for perhaps describing the 
conditions under which the culprit was initially seen. Other information that a witness might 
have been exposed to that could have affected the witness's confidence (and belief in guilt) is 
not a part of that testimony. For example, a witness who overheard a police officer say that 
the identified suspect's fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime wdll not be asked to 
testify that he or she was made aware of the information, much less whether or not it affected 
his or her confidence. 
It is the role of the juror to determine the verity of the evidence, and therefore it might 
be considered an invasion of the jury's domain for the witness to consider incriminating or 
exonerating evidence related to the defendant. The witness's testimony should be limited to 
what he or she saw at the time of the crime. The testimony of a highly confident witness 
whose confidence is based on evidence not directly related to the identification can lead the 
jury to double count that evidence if that evidence is also exhibited in court. Imagine that after 
making an identification a witness is told that the person he or she identified was previously 
convicted of a similar crime. Perhaps in this case the witness was initially uncertain about the 
identification, but upon hearing about the suspect's prior record the witness became convinced 
that he or she had identified the guilty person. Such information may be communicated at a 
very early stage of the investigation of the crime, and may turn out to be untrue. When the 
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witness appears in court, he or she testifies about his or her certainty but not about the fact 
that it was based on information that was unrelated to his or her ability to make an 
identification. If information about the suspect's prior record also is admitted during the trial, 
that single piece of information will carry evidentiary weight with the jury in two forms: 
explicitly in the form of testimony about the suspect's prior record, and implicitly in the form 
of the unexpressed basis for the witness's confidence. Thus the information can be double-
counted by jurors in their determination of the verdict. If information about the suspect's prior 
record is not allowed into court as e^ddence, it may still affect the juiy's decision. 
Witnesses may not necessarily be aware of the factors on which they base their 
confidence judgments. People are not always able to identify the factors that influence their 
responses, or to accurately estimate the degree to which their responses are affected by a 
particular factor (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Nisbett and Wilson assert that people are most 
likely to be accurate in their reports of what is affecting their judgments when the influential 
factors are available, plausible causes, and when there are few (if any) plausible but 
noninfluential factors. In the cases of eyewitness confidence, the effect that extra-memorial 
information has may not be evident to the witness, because there is an alternative plausible 
factor that certainly is affecting their confidence, namely similarity. The low confidence-
accuracy relation, therefore, might be an indication that people are not particularly sensitive to 
what influences their confidence. Of course, asking a witness to make a judgment of certainty 
in no way prohibits the witness from considering all available information. In fact, the 
ambiguity in the confidence question might lead to an equal degree of ambiguity in the answer. 
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A confidence estimate as an indicator of accuracy becomes unreliable to the degree that the 
witness's memory is in error as well as to the degree that any other information on which it is 
based is inaccurate. 
The malleability of confidence probably contributes to its poor performance as an 
indicator of eyewitness accuracy. One potential method of decreasing the eflFects of non-
memorial influences on eyewitness confidence judgments is to obtain a statement of 
confidence fi'om the witness immediately after the identification has been made (Wells & 
Luus, 1990). Inmiediate questioning should lead witnesses to base their confidence judgments 
primarily on their memory and insulate the witness's judgment fi'om non-memorial influences 
that might follow (Wells, 1988). Securing a confidence estimate fi'om the witness immediately 
after the identification, however, will not necessarily negate the influence of all non-memorial 
factors. A witness who identifies someone fi-om a lineup because that person looked "the most 
like the culprit" might be very confident if he or she also believes that police would not ask a 
witness to attempt an identification without already having other evidence against the suspect. 
If the confidence question is meant to be a statement about how much the identified 
suspect resembles the witness's memory for the culprit, a direct question about similarity may 
be a better indicator of the accuracy of the eyewitness's memory. Ecphoric similarity is the 
subjective resemblance between a stimulus and one's memory trace (Tulving, 1981). In the 
case of eyewitness identification, ecphoric similarity is the perceived or judged resemblance 
between the person identified and a witness's memory of the culprit. A witness's judgment of 
how similar the identified suspect is to the witness's memory for the culprit should be based on 
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the witness's memory only, as there is no other relevant information available to the witness on 
which to base that judgment. Although it is assumed that some judgment of similarity 
contributes to the witness's judgment of confidence, there are non-memorial factors that also 
can contribute to that confidence judgment. Ecphoric similarity, therefore, might serve as an 
indicator of eyewitness accuracy based on the witness's memory, unaffected by the influence 
of non-memorial information. 
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PILOT STUDY 
A preliminary study was conducted to determine if there was an ecphoric similarity 
question that was significantly correlated with accuracy. Two features of the ecphoric 
similarity question were manipulated orthogonally, resulting in the four different questions 
that were tested. The first feature concerned whether the identified suspect or the witness's 
memory of the culprit served as the comparison object for the similarity judgment. 
Comparison judgments are often asymmetric (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). For 
example, people judge that Poland resembles the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union 
resembles Poland, suggesting that the choice of which object is being compared to will afiTect 
the degree of perceived resemblance. Therefore, witnesses who are asked to compare their 
memory for the culprit to the identified suspect might make different judgments than those 
who are asked to compare the identified suspect to their memory. 
The second manipulated feature was whether vwtnesses were asked to rate the degree 
of resemblance between the identified suspect and their memory for the culprit on a dimension 
of similarity or on a dimension of difference. Questions about similarities lead people to focus 
on shared features of the comparison objects, whereas questions about differences lead people 
to think about non-shared or distinctive features (Tversky, 1977). Witnesses who rate 
resemblance in terms of the degree of difference should indicate less resemblance than should 
those who rate resemblance in terms of the degree of similarity because a question of 
differences should focus the witness on how the identified person and the culprit do not 
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resemble one another (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). The four versions of the 
similarity question tested were: 
1) Look-Similar: Look carefully at the photo in front of you. How similar is your memory of 
the gunman's appearance to the appearance of the person in the photo you selected? 
2) Look-Different: Look carefully at the photo in front of you. How different is your memory 
of the gunman's appearance to the appearance of the person in the photo you selected? 
3) Imagine-Similar: Try to generate an image of the gunman from the videotape in your mind. 
How similar is the appearance of the person in the photo you selected to your memory of the 
gunman's appearance? 
4) Imagjne-Different: Try to generate an image of the gunman from the videotape in your 
mind. How different is the appearance of the person in the photo you selected to your memory 
of the gunman's appearance? 
Method 
Undergraduate psychology students (A^=250) viewed a videotaped re-enactment of a 
drive-by-shooting, either singly or in pairs. Witnesses were asked to provide a physical 
description of the gunman from the videotape, and then to try to identify the culprit from 6 
photographs arranged in a 2 X 3 array. Half of the participants viewed a lineup containing the 
culprit (culprit-present lineup) whereas the remaining participants viewed a lineup that 
contained a substitute photo that was similar in appearance to the culprit (culprit-absent 
lineup). Participants who made positive identifications from the photospread (w=183) were 
randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions. Participants assigned to the 
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confidence-only control condition (« = 36) answered a confidence question and no ecphoric 
similarity questions. In the four ecphoric similarity conditions, participants responded to two 
of the four versions of the ecphoric similarity question followed by a confidence question (« = 
33 for the look-similar condition, w = 38 for remaining conditions). For example, participants 
who responded to a question on a similarity (e.g., look-similar) answered the corresponding 
question on a difference scale (e.g., look-dififerent), and vice-versa. 
Responses to the ecphoric similarity questions were on made on an 11-point scale, 
with endpoints labeled 0 (not at all similar) to 10 {completely similar) for the similarity 
questions, and 0 (not at all different) to 10 {completely different) for the difference questions. 
The confidence question asked witnesses to indicate "How confident are you that the person 
you identified is the gunman fi-om the videotape?" on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled 
0 {not at all confident) to 10 {completely confident). All participants indicated how confident 
they were, allowing a confidence-accuracy correlation to be calculated for each of the four 
ecphoric similarity groups as well as the confidence-only control group. In addition, similarity-
confidence correlations were calculated for the first ecphoric similarity question responded to 
by participants in the ecphoric similarity conditions. 
Results 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all reported statistical tests. Mean confidence was 
higher for witnesses who identified the culprit (accurate identifications) than for witnesses 
who either identified the culprit-replacement or another lineup member (inaccurate 
identifications), Ms = 6.46 and 5.66, SDs = 2.14 and 1.85, respectively, F{\, 173) = 7.28, 
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p - .01, fif = .41. Mean witness confidence did not differ as a function of being asked any other 
question, F (4,173) = 1.09,/? = .36. In other words, asking witnesses to make an ecphoric 
similarity judgment in any form did not affect their mean confidence (see Table 1). 
Although the form of the ecphoric similarity question did not affect mean confidence, 
it did affect the confidence-accuracy correlation. The confidence-accuracy correlation of 
participants who responded to the look-different question first was significantly greater than 
zero, r(36) = .38,/? = .02, but the correlation was not significant for the other three versions 
Table 1 
Mean Confidence and Ecphoric Similarity by Question Condition 
Question condition Confidence Similarity 
Confidence 6.03 (2.06)a 
Look-Similar 6.18(2.00)a 6.42 (1.79)a 
Look-Different 6.26(2.19)a 4.87 (2.00)b 
Imagine-Similar 5.53 (2.08)a 6.08 (1.28)a 
Imagine-Different 6.00 (1.74)a 5.53 (2.02)ab 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Means within a 
colunm that have different subscripts are significantly different at 
p < .05 by the Student-Newman-Kuels test. 
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of the ecphoric similarity question (see Table 2). The confidence-accuracy correlation for the 
confidence-only participants was not significantly different fi-om zero, /*(34) = .29, p = .08, 
and also not significantly different fi'om the confidence-accuracy correlation of the look-
dififerent condition, z = .416, p = .68 . 
Ecphoric judgments made on the difference dimension (the look-different and imagine-
dififerent questions) were reverse-scored for comparison to responses on the similarity 
Table 2 
Correlations Between Confidence, Ecphoric Similarity and Accuracy 
Question condition 
Correlation 
Confidence-
accuracy 
Similarity-
accuracy 
Similarity-
confidence 
Confidence ^ .29 
Look-Similar'' .16 .02 "71*** 
Look-Different .38* 44** 45** 
Ima^e-Similar -.04 .16 64*** 
Lna^e-Different .19 .22 .38* 
®« = 36.^« = 33.''w = 38. 
* p <  .05, two-tailed. **p< .01, two tailed. ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
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dimension questions. Witnesses who made an accurate identification judged resemblance 
between the identified person and the culprit to be higher than did witnesses who made an 
inaccurate identification, A/s = 6.20 and 5.35, SDs = 1.87 and 1.81, respectively, F(l, 139) = 
7.12, JP = .002, d= .45. Witnesses who judged resemblance on a dimension of difference 
mdicated a lower degree of correspondence between the identified person and the culprit than 
did witnesses who judged resemblance on a dimension of similarity, Ms = 5.20 and 6.24, SDs 
= 2.03 and 1.54, respectively, F(l, 139)= 10.08,/; = .002, </=.54. Only one of the ecphoric 
similarity questions (look-different) was significantly correlated with accuracy, r(36) = .44, p 
= .006 (see Table 2). 
Discussion 
The pilot study revealed that an ecphoric similarity question of the look-different form 
was significantly correlated with eyewitness accuracy, and that asking people to estimate 
confidence after such a similarity question resulted in a significant correlation between 
eyewtness confidence and eyewitness accuracy. It is possible that asking an appropriate 
question about ecphoric similarity provides witnesses with a salient basis for their confidence 
judgments. Witnesses who are not explicitly asked about similarity may be more inclined to 
consider other factors that may be unrelated to accuracy, resulting in a lower confidence-
accuracy correlation. 
There is research related to the idea that certain types of questions can serve as mental 
databases for subsequent questions. In one study (Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988) for 
example, people were asked to indicate their "happiness with life in general" and their 
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"happiness with dating". When people were asked to rate their general happiness first, the 
correlation between the two measures of happiness was significantly smaller than when people 
were asked to indicate their "happiness \\dth dating" prior to being asked about their 
"happiness in general", rs = .16 and .55, respectively. The researchers concluded that asking a 
more specific question (e.g., happiness with dating) primed participants' answers to a 
subsequent general question (e.g., happiness with life in general). When "happiness with 
dating" is the first judgment made it can serve as a source of information for the second 
judgment of "happiness in general". In the case of an identifying witness, there are numerous 
potential sources of information on which to base a confidence judgment. However, the 
v^tness who is asked to make an ecphoric similarity judgment may use that information as a 
mental database in making a subsequent confidence judgment. Priming people about similarity 
may lead them to base their judgments of confidence on that factor rather than on competing 
non-memorial factors. 
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MAIN EXPERIMENT 
The pilot study indicated that responses to one form of an ecphoric similarity question 
were significantly correlated with eyewitness accuracy. However, the confidence accuracy 
correlation also was high, and with a larger sample would probably have been significant as 
well. It would be premature to conclude that the ecphoric similarity judgment is superior to 
the eyewitness confidence judgment as an indicator of eyewitness accuracy. Recall that one 
factor that contributes to the unreliability of the confidence measure as an indicator of 
accuracy is its susceptibility to non-memorial influences. It has yet to be determined whether 
or not the ecphoric similarity measure also is strongly influenced by non-memorial factors. If 
similarity judgments are affected by non-memorial factors, similarity judgments may prove to 
be as equally unreliable indicators of eyewitness accuracy as confidence judgments. 
From a practical standpoint, it would be unfortunate if the ecphoric similarity judgment 
is affected by extra-memorial factors because it would lose its value as a relatively pure 
measure of accuracy, just as confidence has been shown to be an impure measure based on 
factors other than accuracy. From a theoretical perspective, however, the influence of non-
memorial manipulations on an ecphoric judgment would be provocative. Such a finding would 
raise interesting questions about a person's ability to make a judgment based only on his or 
her memory, and a person's ability to assess the accuracy of his or her memory as an 
eyewitness. 
There are two general ways in which non-memorial factors could influence ecphoric 
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judgments. First, extra-memorial factors might actually change the original memory trace, 
rendering it more similar to the identified suspect or less similar to the identified suspect 
depending upon the type of additional information that the witness considered. One process 
that could inflate ecphoric similarity would be for an image of the identified suspect to be 
substituted for the witness's memory for the actual culprit. Indeed, this memory substitution 
process would lead to an erasure of any discrepancies between the memory for the culprit and 
the physical characteristics of the identified suspect, resulting in a correspondingly high (but 
meaningless) ecphoric similarity judgment. There is little evidence fi-om the relevant memory 
literature to suggest that an original memory trace is ever actually changed (Chandler, 1991; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Windschitl, 1993). Therefore it is unlikely that an ecphoric 
similarity judgment would be affected by non-memorial factors via the witness altering his or 
her original memory of the culprit. 
A second and more likely way that extra-memorial factors might influence ecphoric 
judgments is via the operation of a confirmation bias (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
The original memory might remain intact and unaffected by extra-memorial factors, but these 
extra-memorial factors might create a bias to search for ecphoric similarities (in the case of 
incriminating factors) or ecphoric differences (in the case of exonerating factors). 
The present study examined the effects of two types of non-memorial information on 
confidence and ecphoric similarity judgments: co-witness agreement, and the suspect's prior 
criminal involvement. Co-witness agreement evidence has been shown to affect confidence 
(Luus & Wells, 1994), presumably because it increases the witness's belief that the person is 
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guilty. Should co-witness agreement aflFect ecphoric similarity? To the extent that such 
information only increases an eyewitness's subjective likelihood of guilt, the expectation 
would be that similarity would not be affected. The fact that another witness identified the 
same individual could be interpreted, however, as a statement about the degree of resemblance 
between the identified person and the culprit. And if, for example, resemblance is so great that 
another person believes that the culprit and the identified person are the same, the witness's 
estimation of similarity might be increased. 
Should the fact that a suspect has had prior involvement in similar crimes affect 
eyewitness confidence? Although not directly relevant to the determination of whether or not 
the suspect is guilty of committing the most recent crime, it is likely that such information will 
affect the Avitness's estimation of guilt, and therefore increase the witness's confidence 
judgment. A suspect's prior record, however, should not affect judgments of ecphoric 
similarity because that fact in no way addresses the correspondence between the eyewitness's 
memory of the culprit and the suspect's appearance. 
There are five main questions that the present study addresses: 
To what degree does co-witness agreement information affect the confidence of 
accurate witnesses? 
Does incriminating information about an identified suspect's previous criminal 
involvement affect eyewitness confidence? 
Do co-witness agreement and prior record information affect ecphoric similarity 
judgments made by eyewitnesses? 
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Do ecphoric similarity judgments affect confidence by focusing witnesses on ecphoric 
similarity as a basis for their confidence judgments? 
Are people aware that non-memorial information influences their confidence? 
Overview 
The general procedure was modeled after the procedure used by Luus and Wells 
(1994). Undergraduate participants Avitnessed a staged theft that they were led to believe was 
real, and then each witness was interrogated individually by a person who pretended to be a 
campus security ofQcer. The interrogation included the solicitation of details of the crime from 
the -mtness, the opportunity for the witness to attempt an identification of the culprit fi'om a 
set of photographs, and measures of eyewitness confidence and ecphoric similarity. 
Participants were randomly assigned to view either a culprit-absent or a culprit-present 
photospread. Participants who correctly identified the culprit firom a culprit-present 
photospread were placed in the accurate identification condition. All participants who made an 
identification from a culprit-absent photospread were placed in the inaccurate identification 
condition, as were participants who identified anyone other than the culprit fi'om a culprit-
present photospread. 
After a witness made an identification, the security officer either immediately asked the 
witness to make ecphoric similarity and confidence judgments (no-information condition), or 
first told the witness that his or her co-witness had identified the same person from the 
photospread (co-witness condition), or that the person he or she had identified had been 
involved in a previous thefl (prior-involvement condition) before asking the witness to make 
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the similarity and confidence judgments.. 
The order of the dependent measures was also manipulated such that half of the 
witnesses answered the ecphoric similarity question before the confidence question (similarity-
first condition), and the other half of the witnesses answered the questions in the reverse order 
(confidence-first condition). 
Predictions 
Ecphoric Similarity 
1) Ecphoric similarity will be judged higher by participants who make accurate 
identifications than by participants who make inaccurate identifications. A photograph of the 
actual culprit should more closely resemble a person's memory of the culprit than should a 
photograph of another person. 
2) There Avill be no increase in ecphoric similarity as a function of receiving 
information about a co-witness's identification decision or about the identified person's prior 
criminal involvement. 
3) People's perceptions of similarity will not be affected by whether their confidence 
has been assessed prior to making the similarity judgment. 
Confidence 
1) Witnesses who make accurate identifications will indicate greater confidence than 
will witnesses who make inaccurate identifications. The most recent meta-analysis on the 
confidence-accuracy relation estimated r = .25 (Bothwell et al., 1987), and therefore accurate 
Aptnesses should be more confident than inaccurate witnesses. 
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2) Witnesses who receive either co-witness agreement or prior involvement 
information will be more confident than will witnesses who do not receive non-memorial 
information. 
3) The confidence of accurate eyewitnesses will be less affected by non-memorial 
information than Avill the confidence of inaccurate eyewitnesses. Although the most recent 
confidence malleability study (Luus & Wells, 1994) found that co-witness agreement 
information did inflate eyewitness confidence, all of the witnesses in that study were 
inaccurate. Wells et al. (1981) found that only inaccurate eyewitnesses raised their confidence 
level after being briefed about the types of questions they would receive in an upcoming cross-
examination. Therefore, inaccurate witnesses receiving non-memorial information should 
inflate their confidence estimates to a greater degree than should accurate witnesses. 
4) Confidence will be lower for witnesses who answer the similarity question before 
the confidence question than for witnesses who answer the confidence question before the 
similarity question. Answering the similarity question should focus witnesses on similarity as a 
basis for confidence and thereby reduce the potentially biasing effects of non-memorial 
information. 
5) When witnesses receive non-memorial information, confidence will be higher when 
the confidence question is asked before the similarity question than when the similarity 
question is asked before the confidence question. The ecphoric similarity question will provide 
the witness with a specific basis for making the confidence judgment, reducing the inflation 
effect that the non-memorial information has on eyewitness confidence. 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred fifty-nine undergraduate psychology students (77 women and 82 men) 
volunteered to participate in the experiment in exchange for course credit. All attempts were 
made to have two participants as witnesses during each experimental session in order that 
each participant could serve as the other participant's co-witness. When this type of pairing 
was not possible^ a confederate acted as another participant during the session. Confederates 
were instructed to let the participant provide information prompted by the experimenter 
during the session. If it became necessaiy for confederates to provide information, they were 
instructed to repeat what the other participant revealed, or to provide only minimal 
information. 
Photospreads 
Three white undergraduate students (one man and two women) assumed the role of 
thief in this study. A culprit-present photospread and a culprit-absent photospread were 
constructed for each confederate-thief, resulting in a total of six unique photospreads. Each 
photospread consisted of a suspect photo (either the culprit or a high-resemblance culprit 
replacement) and five distractor photos. Any single confederate's culprit-present and culprit-
absent photospreads contained the same five distractor photographs, and differed only on 
whether the photospread contained a photograph of the culprit or of a high-resemblance 
replacement. Consistent with the type of photospreads used by Luus and Wells (1994), one of 
the five distractors for each confederate's photospread was selected to have some 
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resemblance to the confederate (i.e., might be considered a plausible match to the confederate) 
while the remaining distractors were selected to not resemble the confederate. 
Procedure 
Participants were met by the experimenter at a remote location and brought to the 
experimental room. Participants each signed a consent form (see Appendix A) indicating their 
willingness to participate in an experiment concerned with how evaluations of a person were 
influenced by knowledge of that person's opinions and appearance. Participants were told in 
the consent form and by the experimenter that they would be asked to examine questionnaire 
responses and photographs of people m order to evaluate them. As part of the cover story, the 
experimenter stated that following the completion of the experimental session, he or she 
would ask participants if they would be willing to have their photograph taken to be used for 
the study in the future. 
After the general outline of the study was described the experimenter attempted to 
enter an adjoining room where the experimental umterials were kept, only to discover that the 
door was locked. The experimenter asked participants to remain in the room while he or she 
went to get a key to unlock the door. Almost immediately after the experimenter left, a 
confederate-thief opened the door of the locked room, looked around, and quickly left the 
experimental area carrying a camera. The experimenter returned to find the previously locked 
door to be open. When necessary, the experimenter prompted the participants to explain why 
the door was opened, as well as the whereabouts of the camera. The experimenter, pretending 
to be very worried, then called who he or she identified as his or her supervisor on a 
disconnected telephone to recount the story of the theft and to find out what should be done 
about it. During the phone conversation, the experimenter communicated the idea that the 
thief must have been a previous participant in the study because nobody else would have 
known about the location of the camera. The experimenter also mentioned over the phone that 
there is a list of names and photographs of all the previous participants in the study. After the 
call, the experimenter reported to the participants that the supervisor was calling the campus 
police, and that they would continue the study as planned until the campus security officer 
arrived. Participants were placed in separate rooms and were asked to fill out several 
questionnaires as the first step in the experiment as described to them in the cover story. 
When the campus security officer (also a confederate) arrived, the experimenter 
recounted the story of the crime, mentioning the existence of the two witnesses as well as the 
set of photographs of possible suspects. The security officer asked that the doors to the rooms 
that contained the participants be closed in order that the officer could talk to each of the 
witnesses individually. This allowed each witness to believe that the other witness had already 
been interviewed and had attempted an identification. During the interview procedure the 
security officer first asked witnesses to describe what they could remember, and pretended to 
take notes of their recollections. The officer then asked the experimenter to bring in the 
photographs for the identification procedure. The officer removed a subset of photographs 
firom the fiill set, indicating to the witness that all the photographs that could possibly 
correspond to the witness's description of the culprit were being removed for the 
identification procedure. The photographs used for a particular photospread were fi-equently 
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shufQed and were presented to participants in no systematic order or layout. The officer 
placed 6 photographs in front of the witness and asked the witness to identify the culprit. To 
help secure a high identification rate, the officer asked each witness to "identify the person 
that you saw" without explicit reference to the possibility that the culprit may not be present 
(Malpass & Devine, 1984). 
For each witness who made a positive identification, the officer provided one of three 
types of information: (a) no information, (b) the other witness had identified the same person, 
or (c) the person identified had been involved in a previous theft. Each witness was then asked 
in a randomly determined order to make a confidence judgment and an ecphoric similarity 
judgment. 
Confidence was assessed by the officer asking "How confident are you that this is the 
person that you saw with the camera, say, on a scale from one to ten, with ten being 
completely confident?". To measure ecphoric similarity, the officer said to the witness "I'd like 
for you to look carefully at this photo, and tell me how different is your memory of the person 
you saw from the person in this picture? Let's say, on a scale from one to ten, with one being 
not at all different and ten being completely different?". 
After both witnesses had been interviewed, the experimenter brought them together 
for debriefing (see Appendix B). During the debriefing procedure, the experimenter revealed 
that the true purpose of the study had to do with eyewitness identification, that the theft had 
been staged for the experiment, and that the thief and the campus security officer were 
actually confederates. After this basic information was revealed but before any specifics about 
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the variables of interest or hypotheses were revealed, participants filled out a brief final 
questionnaire that included manipulation checks and some questions about their confidence 
judgments (see Appendix C). After participants had completed the questionnaires they were 
completely debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. (For a fiill version of the script used in the 
study see Appendix D.) This research was approved by the Iowa State University Human 
Subjects Review Committee. 
Suhsample used for analysis 
Positive identifications were made by 122 (58 women and 64 men) of the 159 
participants who witnessed the staged crime (a 77% positive identification rate). The 
identification rate was 83% (72 out of 87) for witnesses who viewed a culprit-present 
photospread, and 69% (50 out of 72) for witnesses who viewed a culprit-absent photospread. 
Twenty-six of the 122 witnesses who made an identification were removed from the sample 
used for analyses in order that the number of witnesses who had been exposed to each of the 
three confederate thieves would be represented equally in each of the experimental cells. 
Witnesses to two of the thieves (one male and one female) appear three times in each 
between-subjects experimental cell and witnesses to the third thief (female) appear twice in 
each cell. Participants were removed from cells that contained an imbalance under the 
following rules; (a) participants who had identified distractors from culprit-present 
photospreads were removed first (n = 13), followed by (b) participants who miscategorized 
their experimental condition as indicated by their responses to manipulation checks (n = 7), 
followed by (c) participants who did neither (a) nor (b) (« = 6). Participants were randomly 
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chosen for removal based on a particular criterion provided that there were no participants 
remaining in the preceding category. The final sample of 96 witnesses consisted of 45 women 
and 51 men. 
Four of the 48 witnesses (8.3%) included in the inaccurate identification condition 
were witnesses who made an inaccurate identification fi-om a culprit-present photospread, and 
therefore the inaccurate identification condition is not completely composed of identifications 
fi-om culprit-absent photospreads. There were no significant differences in mean confidence 
between witnesses who made inaccurate identifications fi-om culprit-present photospreads and 
those who made inaccurate identifications fi-om culprit-absent photospreads, Ms = 5.18 and 
5.46, SDs = 1.78 and 1.91, respectively, /(65) = .54,p=.53. The inclusion of distractor 
identifications fi-om culprit-present lineups did not differ significantly between information 
condition, x^(2, N= 48) = .55, p = .76. Fifteen of the 96 witnesses (15.6%) were paired with a 
confederate rather than with another participant. The fi-equency of these confederate-paired 
•witnesses did not differ between the accuracy or information conditions, x^(5, N = 96) = 5.45, 
p = 36. Means for the primaiy dependent measures of confidence and ecphoric similarity did 
not differ significantly between the participant-paired and confederate-paired groups, t (94) = 
-1.23,p = .22, d= 0.25 for confidence and t (94) = -1.44,p- AS, d= 0.30 for ecphoric 
similarity. Confidence judgments were not significantly higher for confederate-paired 
witnesses than for participant-paired witnesses, Ms = 6.3 and 5.6, SDs = 2.0 and 1.9, 
respectively. Ecphoric judgments were also not significantly higher for confederate-paired 
than for participant-pMred witnesses, Ms = 6.3 and 5.7, SDs =1.2 and 1.5, respectively. 
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Results 
Manipulation checks 
Participants were asked after they participated in the experiment whether they knew 
before the experiment began that they would witness a theft as part of the experiment. One 
participant did not answer the question, and the remaining 95 indicated that they were not 
aware that they would witness a staged crime. 
To determine if the information manipulation was successful, witnesses were asked 
two questions on the final questionnaire regarding the type of information that they received 
during the experiment: (a) Did the campus police ofiGcer mention that another witness had 
identified the same person as you?, and (b) Did the campus police officer mention that the 
person you identified may have been involved in a prior theft? 
Participants were considered accurate only if their responses to both questions were 
correct. Participants in the co-witness condition who responded afiBrmatively to the first 
question only, participants in the prior-involvement condition who responded aflRrmatively to 
the second question only, and participants in the no-information condition who responded in 
the negative to both questions were scored as correct. Eighty-five of the 96 vntnesses (88.5%) 
responded correctly to both questions, and the number of witnesses in error did not differ 
significantly by information condition, 'x^(2,N= 96) = 2.67, p = .26. The percentage of 
participants who correctly categorized themselves in the co-witness information, prior 
involvement, and no information conditions were 91%, 81%, and 94%, respectively. The 
manipulation of information was relatively successful as indicated by the high percentages of 
wtnesses who were able to recognize the type of information communicated to them. 
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Eyewitness confidence and ecphoric sinularity 
For all analyses ecphoric similarity was reverse-scored so that a higher number 
corresponds to greater perceived similarity. A 3 (Information Condition) x 2 (Identification 
Accuracy) x 2 (Question Order) x 2 (Question Type) repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to test for mean differences on the within-subject measures of 
eyemtness confidence and ecphoric similarity. 
There was no significant main effect for the within-subjects variable of question type, 
and no interactions of question type with any between-subject variables, indicating that the 
confidence and the ecphoric similarity questions were not differentially affected by any 
manipulations (see Appendix E). Ecphoric similarity judgments were expected to be affected 
only by identification accuracy, whereas confidence judgments were expected to be affected 
by the identification accuracy, information, and order variables. The remaining between-
subjects effects must be examined to determine how both confidence and ecphoric similarity 
responded to the accuracy, information, and order variables. 
Confidence was expected to be lower for witnesses who first answered the similarity 
question than for witnesses who answered the confidence question before making the 
similarity judgment. Ecphoric similarity judgments were not expected to differ as a function of 
question order. There were, however, no significant main effects or interactions for the 
order in which the questions were asked (see Appendix E). Confidence was not affected by 
whether or not witnesses first answered the similarity question, nor did similarity differ as a 
function of which question was first asked. 
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Confidence and ecphoric similarity were both expected to be higher for accurate 
witnesses than for inaccurate witnesses, and ecphoric similarity was expected to be higher in 
the co-witness and prior-involvement information conditions than in the no-information 
control condition. No significant main effects for information type or for identification 
accuracy were found (see Appendix E). There was, however, a significant between-subjects 
Information x Identification Accuracy interaction, F (2, 84) = A.\\,p = .02. The form of this 
interaction is described in the next section. 
The lack of within-subject efTects indicates that there were no reliable differences 
between the eyewitness confidence judgments and the ecphoric similarity judgments as a 
fiinction of the between-subjects manipulations. Between-subjects analyses were conducted to 
investigate the effect that identification accuracy and information had on both dependent 
variables. Means and standard deviations for confidence and ecphoric similarity for accurate 
and inaccurate witnesses in each of the information conditions appear in Table 3. 
Between-subjects analysis of confidence 
A series of seven planned nonorthogonal contrasts were used to examine mean 
differences in confidence between cells in the 3 (Information Condition) x 2 (Identification 
Accuracy) interaction. The first three contrasts tested differences in confidence between 
accurate and inaccurate witnesses within each of the three information conditions. The next 
two contrasts tested for differences in confidence between the co-witness-information 
condition and the no-information control condition. The first of these contrasts compared 
confidence for accurate witnesses, and the second compared confidence for inaccurate 
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Tables 
Confideme and Ecphoric Similarity as a Function of 
Information and Accuracy 
Question 
Condition Confidence Similarity 
Co-witness 
accurate 6.69(1.82) 6.50 (1.03) 
inaccurate 4.88 (1.59) 5.50 (1.21) 
Involvement 
accurate 5.44 (2.45) 5.75 (1.69) 
inaccurate 6.44 (1.09) 5.94(1.39) 
Control 
accurate 5.69(1.70) 5.81 (1.33) 
inaccurate 5.13 (2.16) 5.19(1.68) 
Note. Standard de\aations appear in parentheses. 
n = 16 for all means. 
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witnesses. The last two contrasts compared confidence levels between the prior-involvement 
information condition and the no-information condition, the first for accurate witnesses and 
the second for inaccurate witnesses (see Table 4). 
Two of the seven contrasts revealed significant mean differences in confidence. First, 
confidence was significantly higher for inaccurate witnesses in the prior-involvement condition 
than for inaccurate witnesses in the no-information control condition, F (1,90) = 4.02, p = 
.048, Ms = 6.4 and 5.1, respectively. This is consistent with the confidence inflation effect 
expected for witnesses who received non-memorial information. Second, witnesses who 
received co-witness information indicated greater confidence when they were accurate than 
when they were inaccurate, F (1,90) = 7.67, p = .007, Ms = 6.7 and 4.9, respectively. 
Between-subjects analysis of ecphoric similarity 
The same seven contrasts used to examine the effects of identification accuracy and 
information on confidence were used to investigate differences in ecphoric similarity (see 
Table 5). The only contrast that was significant indicated that for witnesses who received co-
witness information, accurate witnesses rated the suspect as more similar to their memory of 
the culprit than did inaccurate witnesses, F(l, 90) = 4.03,/; = .048, Ms = 6.50 and 5.50, 
respectively (see Table 5). Effect size estimates for confidence are slightly higher than the 
corresponding effect size estimates for similarity. According to Cohen (1988), conventional 
effect sizes in the social sciences are 6 = .20 for a small, 6 = .50 for a medium, and 5 = .80 for 
a large effect. It is evident that most of the corresponding effect size estimates for confidence 
and similarity fall within the same general range, fi'om small to medium effect sizes. 
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Table 4 
Simple Effects Contrastsfor Mean Confidence 
Comparison groups F P d 
Accurate vs. Inaccurate 
Co-witness 7.67 .01 .58 
Involvement 2.33 .13 .32 
Control 0.74 .39 .18 
Co-witness vs. Control 
Accurate 2.33 .13 .32 
Inaccurate 0.15 .70 .08 
Involvement vs. Control 
Accurate 0.15 .70 .08 
Inaccurate 4.02 .05 .42 
Note. df= 1,90. 
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Tables 
Simple Effects Contrasts for Mean Ecphoric Similarity 
Comparison groups F P d 
Accurate vs. Inaccurate 
Co-witness 4.03 .05 .42 
Involvement 0.14 .71 .08 
Control 1.57 .21 .26 
Co-witness vs. Control 
Accurate 1.90 .17 .29 
Inaccurate 0.39 .53 .13 
Involvement vs. Control 
Accurate 0.02 .90 .03 
Inaccurate 111 .14 .32 
Note. df=\, 90. 
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Self-reports of factors contributing to confidence 
To determine whether or not witnesses exposed to non-memorial mformation would 
spontaneously indicate that their confidence judgments were affected by that information, they 
were asked to list the factors that they considered in reaching their confidence judgments. The 
open-ended responses were coded by independent judges for references to co-witness and 
prior-involvement information. The two independent judges were in complete agreement for 
all open-ended question coding. Only 1 out of the 32 participants in the co-witness 
information condition spontaneously listed co-witness information as a factor considered in 
reaching a judgment of confidence. No witnesses in the prior-involvement condition listed that 
information as a basis for their confidence judgments in their open-ended responses. 
Eleven of the participants fi"om the sample of 96 indicated that they were concerned 
about the possibility of accusing an innocent person when they were reaching their confidence 
judgments. The number of participants who indicated this concern did not differ significantly 
between information or identification-accuracy condition, (5, N= 96) = 1.75,/»= .88. It is 
possible that such a concern might lead a witness to lower his or her expressed confidence, 
with the intent that authorities not rely on that identification as much as they would if he or 
she indicated greater confidence. The confidence of the Avitnesses concerned about making an 
inaccurate identification, however, was not significantly different firom that of participants who 
did not spontaneously express any concern, / (94) =1.31,/? = .20, d = .27. 
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Self-reported reliance on non-memorial information 
Participants who were told that their co-witness had identified the same person as they 
had were asked to indicate on a S-point scale the degree to which they based their confidence 
on that information. The endpoints of the scale were from 1 (not at all) to 5 {completely). 
The mean of the responses was significantly below the midpoint of the scale, M= 2.52 
and SD = 1.21, /(31) = -2.24,/? < .04. Almost 3/4 of the participants (72.4%) indicated some 
reliance on co-witness information in making their confidence judgments, and nearly 1/4 of the 
participants (24.1%) indicated a value greater than the midpoint of the scale. The percentage 
of participants who indicated values of 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the scale were 20.7%, 27.6%, 20.7%, 
and 3.4%, respectively. It is interesting to note that the degree to which participants said they 
based their confidence on the co-witness information was significantly correlated with their 
actual confidence judgments, /•(29) = .38,/? = .04. 
Participants who received prior-involvement information about the suspect indicated 
on a five-point scale the degree to which their confidence judgments were based on that 
information. The mean of the responses was significantly below the midpoint withM= 2.08 
and SD = 1.00, / (31) = -5.20, p < .0001. Although 60% of the participants in the prior-
involvement condition indicated some reliance on that information in making their confidence 
judgments, only 4% indicated a value greater than the midpoint on the scale. The percentage 
of participants who indicated values of 2, 3,4, and 5 on the scale were 16.0%, 40.0%, 4.0%, 
and 0%, respectively. The correlation between participants' estimates of the degree to which 
their confidence was based on the prior-involvement information and their actual confidence 
judgments was not significant, r(25) = ,01, p - .95. 
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Ej^ erimenter effects 
The confidence inflation that occurred could be due to differential behavior of the 
campus police ofiBcer between information conditions. The first item on the final questionnaire 
asked: Did the Campus Police OfGcer tiy to influence your decision regarding which person 
you should identify from the photo set? Eighty-four of the 96 participants (87.5%) responded 
"no," and response rates did not differ significantly by information condition, x^(5, Ar= 96) = 
3.43,/? = .63. The number of participants who indicated that the officer did try to influence 
their decision regarding whom they should identify in the co-witness, prior-involvement, and 
no-information conditions were n = 6, n = 3, and w = 3, respectively. 
Correlations 
The confidence-accuracy point-biserial correlation across all three information 
conditions was not significantly different fi-om zero, r (94) = .12, p= .244. The similarity-
accuracy correlation was not significantly higher, r (94) = .11, t (93) = -.48,/? > .10. The 
correlation between the two dependent measures of confidence and similarity was significantly 
different from zero, r (94) = .48, p < .001. Correlations within each information condition 
appear in Table 7. 
Discussion 
This experiment examined the effects of extra-memorial information on the confidence 
and ecphoric similarity judgments of eyewitnesses. Results provide some support for the 
hypothesis that factors unrelated to witness memory can affect confidence independent of 
witness identification accuracy. A number of questions are also raised by the unexpected 
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Table? 
Correlations Between Confidence, Ecphoric Similarity and Accuracy 
by Information Condition 
Information condition 
Variables Co-witness Involvement Control 
Confidence-Accuracy .48 (.005) -.26 (.146) .15 (.419) 
Similarity-Accuracy .42 (.018) -.06 (.734) .21 (.253) 
Similarity-Confidence .50 (.004) .62 (.001) .32 (.071) 
Note. Two-tailed p appears in parentheses.« = 32 for all correlations. 
pattern of results that could have implications for police identification procedures. Ecphoric 
similarity judgments, unlike eyewitness confidence, were hypothesized to be resistant to non-
memorial information that becomes available to the witness. As a result, similarity was 
expected to have a stronger relation to accuracy than did confidence. In this study, however, 
witnesses' ecphoric similarity judgments and confidence judgments were not affected by the 
extra-memorial information in any reliably different way. 
If ecphoric similarity judgments had been resistant to non-memorial information it 
potentially could have provided police with a more reliable method of estimating the accuracy 
of eyewitnesses. There is evidence fi'om this study and fi-om previous work (Luus & Wells, 
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1994) that eyewitness confidence estimates can be inflated and deflated by exposing witnesses 
to information that has little or nothing to do with their memory for the culprit or their ability 
to recognize the culprit. It is not difGcult to imagine that a witness could become aware of 
non-memorial information (e.g., the suspect's prior criminal record) during the course of the 
identification procedures, or some time after the witness has made an identification but before 
testifying in court. 
Unlike confidence, an ecphoric similarity judgment is memory-based and should 
therefore not only be a more direct measure of the goodness of the witness's memory, but also 
less affected by variables that are unrelated to memory. Calling to mind an image of a person 
in order to make a comparison is a reconstructive process, however, during which non-
memorial information could affect the image of the person that is generated. The ecphoric 
similarity measure used in the present study was affected by the non-memorial information, 
and thus it seems that ecphoric similarity judgments can be as unreliable as confidence 
judgments as indicators of memory-based witness accuracy. 
There were two possible explanations discussed earlier for a similarity inflation effect 
due to non-memorial information. The first possibility was that the witness might substitute 
the appearance of the identified suspect for the culprit in his or her memory. The second 
possibility was a confirmation bias, such that the witness might search for evidence in support 
of the belief that the suspect and the culprit were the same and should therefore have a high 
degree of resemblance. Neither of these possible explanations would predict that similarity 
judgments would be affected differentially by the two forms of non-memorial information. If 
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either the substitution or confirmation bias explanations were correct, witnesses receiving 
either of the two types of non-memorial information should have updated their memories or 
conducted a biased search for similarities. Ecphoric similarity judgments were significantly 
affected by one type of non-memorial information, the prior record information, but not 
affected by the co-witness information. The fact that ecphoric similarity judgments responded 
differently to the two tjrpes of non-memorial information raises questions about the plausibility 
of either of these explanations in the present study. 
A third possible explanation for the relation between confidence and similarity is that 
v^tnesses made their ecphoric judgments based on how confident they were, and therefore 
their ecphoric judgments were sensitive to factors that affected their confidence judgments. 
Witnesses' confidence and ecphoric similarity judgments were highly correlated (r = .48), and 
the significant interaction that took an unexpected form for both variables suggests a close 
relation between confidence and similarity. The fact that there was no effect for the order in 
which the confidence and similarity questions were asked also points to either the same or a 
similar mechanism driving both of these variables. An ancillary analysis revealed th^t when 
controlling for similarity, there was still a significant interaction between identification 
accuracy and information on eyewitness confidence judgments, (2, 89) = 3.14,/? = .048. 
When controlling for confidence there was no significant interaction between identification 
accuracy and information on ecphoric similarity judgments, F (2,89) = .\\,p= .894. 
The idea that confidence judgments somehow influence witnesses' ecphoric similarity 
judgments is counter-intuitive. In fact, it was predicted that asking witnesses to make ecphoric 
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judgments first would focus them on similarity as a basis for their confidence judgments. In 
other words, ecphoric similarity judgments would have a significant effect on witness 
confidence. In this study, however, neither mean confidence nor the confidence-accuracy 
relation was affected by whether or not witnesses first made similarity judgments. There is 
little evidence, therefore, that witnesses were basing their confidence judgments on ecphoric 
similarity. 
A fourth explanation that seems most consistent with the data has to do with people's 
interpretation of the similarity question. Witnesses who make identifications in the real world 
probably expect the police to ask them how certmn they are that they have identified the 
culprit. There is no evidence that the witnesses in this experiment did not believe that they had 
seen an actual crime take place, so presumably they would not find a question about their 
certainty to seem unusual either. It might have been difficult, however, for witnesses to 
interpret the ecphoric similarity question as one only of perceived similarity. 
In the context of a psychology experiment (such as the pilot study), it is not hard for 
people to imagine that the researcher might be interested in their perceptions of similarity. In 
the context of a criminal investigation, however, witnesses might not understand what 
purpose would be served by asking them to make such a simple perceptual judgment. For 
witnesses with the expectation that they would be asked a certainty question, the ecphoric 
similarity measure may have served that purpose in their minds. In a sense, degree of similarity 
became the dimension they used to indicate their certainty or confidence, with witnesses who 
wanted to communicate to the police that they were certain indicating high similarity. When 
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witnesses were asked the similarity question, they might have interpreted it not as "How 
similar are the suspect and your memory of the culprit?" but rather "Are you sure the suspect 
and the culprit are the same person?", which can be considered a question about the certainty 
of the witness. 
Effects of co-witness information on confidence 
There was no significant confidence inflation effect for the accurate witnesses who 
received co-witness information. This study failed to replicate the confidence inflation effect 
for inaccurate witnesses as a function of co-witness agreement information that was obtained 
by Luus and Wells (1994). The present study differs from Luus and Wells in several ways that 
might have contributed to the unexpected null effect. 
First, the two studies differed in the amount of time between the introduction of extra-
memorial information and the point at which witnesses were asked about their confidence. In 
the Luus and Wells study, there was at least a several minute delay between the time that the 
information manipulation was delivered and the time that witnesses were asked to make a 
confidence judgment. There was an even longer delay in the other previous study that 
examined confidence inflation effects. Witnesses who were asked to consider their responses 
to cross-examination questions in the "briefing" study had 18 minutes after they had been 
briefed by the experimenter to consider their confidence estimates (Wells, et al., 1981). The 
delay between the presentation of non-memorial information and the solicitation of the 
confidence or similarity judgment was between 5-10 seconds in the present study. Perhaps this 
comparatively brief interval did not allow witnesses enough time to process the information to 
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the degree that they could use that information in estimating their confidence. If that is the 
case, it may be that even when witnesses are exposed to co-'mtness information, securing a 
confidence statement fi'om a witness immediately after that point is sufficient to prevent any 
confidence inflation effects that would otherwise have resulted fi'om the co-witness 
information. 
A second difference is that witnesses in the Luus and Wells study were asked to make 
an identification by the experimenter rather than by a security ofiicer. Having to make an 
identification in the presence of an officer might have made more salient the consequences of 
making a positive identification, particularly a very confident one. In contrast, identifying the 
potential culprit for the experimenter might have been considered by participants as merely 
"helping out" the experimenter without full awareness that they may be called upon for more 
information. The fact that there was a confidence inflation effect for the witnesses in the prior 
involvement condition, however, suggests that the lack of a confidence inflation effect as a 
function of co-witness agreement information was not merely unwillingness on the part of 
witnesses. This difference between the Luus and Wells study and the present study could have 
contributed to the lower mean confidence as well as the lower positive identification rate 
found in the present study. 
Witnesses in the co-witness information condition who were accurate were 
significantly more confident than were witnesses who were inaccurate. It was predicted that 
accurate Avitnesses would be more confident than inaccurate witnesses overall, but to a lesser 
degree when Avitnesses received non-memorial information. The only significant difference in 
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confidence between accurate and inaccurate witnesses, however, was in the co-witness 
information condition. Although accurate witnesses were more confident than inaccurate 
witnesses in the co-\wtness information condition, this was not attributable to differential 
effects of co-witness information. 
Effects of prior-involvement information on confidence 
Inaccurate 'mtnesses who received prior-involvement information indicated greater 
levels of confidence than inaccurate witnesses who received no information. There was no 
confidence inflation effect for the accurate witnesses, which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that non-memorial information would have greater impact on the confidence judgments of 
inaccurate witness than on those of accurate witnesses. It is clear that the lack of confidence 
inflation for accurate witnesses was not due to a confidence ceiling effect. Mean confidence 
for the accurate witnesses was only 5.4 on the 10-point scale, and therefore there was room 
on the scale for witnesses to indicate higher levels of confidence. One reason for the 
differential effects of prior-involvement information on the confidence of accurate and 
inaccurate witnesses could be that the accurate witnesses already have some basis for making 
confidence judgments, namely the similarity between the photo of the culprit and their 
memory of the culprit. Inaccurate witnesses cannot rely on resemblance to the same degree as 
accurate witnesses, which could lead them to incorporate other information that is made 
available into their confidence estimations. The incorporation of non-memorial information is 
particularly problematic if it is confined only to inaccurate witnesses, for it is the increased 
confidence of the inaccurate witnesses that lead triers-of-fact to believe what is, affer all, 
inaccurate testimony. 
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How are co-witness information and prior-involvement information different? 
A confidence inflation effect occurred for inaccurate witnesses exposed to prior-
involvement information, but the expected effect for co-witness information did not occur. An 
examination of how these two types of information differ might offer some insight regarding 
why the co-witness information failed to afifect witness confidence. Both prior-involvement 
and co-witness information were expected to raise confidence by increasing the suspect's 
likelihood of guilt in the nund of the witness, but the types of information may not be 
equivalent in the way that they influence the likelihood of guilt estimate. 
Information that a co-witness has made the same identification is a statement about the 
co-witness's belief that the suspect is the culprit. Although the information about a co-
witness's belief may affect a witness's likelihood of guilt estimate, the witness should first 
have to make a judgment about the degree to which he or she is willing to trust the memoiy of 
the co-witness. There is evidence that Avitnesses consider closely the co-witness's memory, at 
least in relation to their own memories. Witnesses in the Luus and Wells (1994) study whose 
co-witness identified a plausible person from the lineup lowered their confidence relative to 
witnesses in the control group, whereas witnesses whose co-witness identified an unlikely or 
implausible person showed an increase in confidence over control witnesses. It appears that 
witnesses were taking into account their perceived reliability of their co-witness. 
Witnesses do have some other way of interpreting their co-witness's identification 
evidence by virtue of having the same general experience. If a witness makes a relative 
judgment (selecting the lineup member who looks the most like culprit) it would be reasonable 
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for him or her to think that the other witness also might have chosen the "closest" person 
without a strong belief that that person is the culprit. The co-witness information under those 
conditions is not necessarily convincing evidence that the witness (or the co-witness for that 
matter) is correct. It is also possible that the witnesses in the control condition assumed that 
their co-witness made the same identification as they did even though they were not provided 
that information. Witnesses in the control and co-witness conditions would have made their 
confidence and ecphoric judgments under the same assumptions, which might account for the 
lack of inflation effects for the co-witness agreement witnesses. 
Witnesses who receive prior-involvement information, on the other hand, do not have 
to make any judgments regarding the reliability of their co-witness's memory. The information 
that they are given is unrelated to their memory or the memory of their co-witness, because it 
has nothing to do with the most recent theft. Although this information does not constitute 
direct evidence that the suspect committed the recent theft, learning that the suspect had been 
involved in a prior theft might increase a witness's belief that the suspect is guilty. It is 
probably persuasive to the most uncertain witness to learn that out of all of the people who 
had previously been in the experiment, the person that he or she thought looked most similar 
to the culprit had a criminal background. It would be difiicult for witnesses to dismiss this as 
mere coincidence, or to construct a reasonable explain that is based on the assumption that the 
identified person is actually innocent of the crime. In contrast, witnesses in the co-witness 
agreement condition who are relatively uncertain in their choice can assume that the other 
witness went through the same decision-making process that they did (whatever that might 
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have been). The fact that their co-vwtness made the same identification, therefore, may not be 
interpreted by witnesses as a form of independent evidence that the suspect is guilty. 
Witnesses who receive either type of information may decide that the information is an 
inappropriate basis for confidence (ahhough whether or not witnesses can prevent its effects 
on their judgments remains an open question). Witnesses who receive prior-involvement 
information do not have to struggle with the interpretation of the information that the other 
witness has provided. Due to the short time lag between the introduction of the non-memorial 
evidence and the request for confidence and similarity judgments by the officer in the present 
study, it is possible that witnesses did not have the time that was necessary for them to 
complete the evaluation of the co-witness and the co-witness's identification, and therefore it 
was not incorporated into their confidence judgments. 
Self-reported reliance on non-memorial information 
Only one witness out of the 32 exposed to co-witness information spontaneously 
mentioned the information as a contributing factor in their confidence judgments. When asked 
specifically about the degree to which the co-witness information affected their confidence, 
three-fourths mentioned that it had some effect. Although no witnesses who received prior-
involvement information mentioned that information on the listing task, about 60% of them 
indicate some reliance when directly asked about its influence. This is an indication that people 
believe that there is nothing unacceptable with using these forms of non-memorial information 
as a basis for confidence. People may believe that this information has direct bearing on 
whether or not the suspect is guilty, and it is therefore appropriate to consider when 
estimating their own confidence. 
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The fact that witnesses indicated some reliance on extra-memorial information does 
not mean that they were able to accurately report the impact that it had on their confidence. 
The correlation between witnesses' estimates of their reliance on prior-involvement 
information and their confidence judgments was not significantly different fi'om zero. 
However, in the co-witness condition, self-reported reliance was positively correlated with 
actual confidence, such that the people who indicated that they relied more on the co-witness 
information in their confidence judgments had actually been more confident. One 
interpretation of this is that co-Avitness information did increase confidence and witnesses 
were aware of that influence. An alternative is that when asked about the effect of co-witness 
information on their confidence levels, witnesses who had indicated a high degree of 
confidence took advantage of the opportunity to point to a source other than their own 
memories for their confidence in their identifications, in the event that they should turn out to 
be incorrect. Witnesses were asked about the sources of their confidence after they had been 
made aware that they were in a psychology experiment related to eyewitness identification, 
which might have led them to consider more seriously the possibility that they had made an 
error, or had even been led into making an error. 
It is interesting that the co-witness information did not affect witness confidence, yet 
witnesses' estimates of influence were correlated with their confidence. In comparison, prior-
involvement information did have some effect on witness confidence, but witnesses were not 
able to effectively assess that influence. It seems unlikely that estimating confidence was a 
process for which witnesses had introspective access. Witnesses may instead have engaged in 
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a retrospective search for reasons that they might be confident in order for them to evaluate 
the impact that extra-memorial information had on their judgments. They may have been 
indicating how much they believed that extra-memorial information should affect a judgment 
of confidence (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Nisbett and Wilson suggested that when asked to 
indicate how a response was affected by a given stimulus people make judgments based on 
how plausible it is that the stimulus would have affected the response (p. 248). There was a 
tendency for witnesses who received co-witness information to be more willing to indicate 
that they relied on that information than were witnesses who received prior-involvement 
information (although the difference was not significant). Witnesses may have found it more 
plausible that co-witness agreement information would affect their confidence judgments than 
information about the prior record of the suspect. It is also possible that witnesses consider it 
less legitimate to base their confidence judgments on prior involvement information than to 
base them on co-witness information. 
The correlation between witnesses' confidence and their estimates of the influence that 
co-witness agreement information had on confidence might be a function of whether witnesses 
had any reason to indicate some reliance on a factor other than their own memories. Witnesses 
who were not very confident had no need to search for reasons to defend their lack of 
confidence. Confident witnesses may have felt obligated to not only come up with reasons for 
why they thought they were right, but also to cite some factor or factors other than their own 
memories on which to blame a false identification in the event that they were wrong about the 
identity of the suspect. 
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Suggestions forfuture research 
The timing of the presentation of non-memorial information and the assessment of 
eyewitness confidence may be critical for confidence inflation (or deflation) effects to occur. 
The amount of time needed to fully consider non-memorial information may be greater than 
that allowed in the present study. The relatively brief period between the presentation of non-
memorial evidence and the estimation of confidence and similarity may have contributed to the 
lack of confidence inflation effects in the co-witness identification condition. Witnesses 
provided with an extended period of time to consider their confidence (i.e., longer than the 10 
minutes allowed in the Luus and Wells study) may be able to consider more carefully how 
certain they are, and perhaps the reasons for their certainty. Under these conditions witnesses 
may be less affected by non-memorial information. Future research could investigate the 
degree to which the length of time between the introduction of non-memorial information and 
the witness's confidence judgment contributes to the malleability of eyewitness confidence. 
The interval between the witness's identification and the introduction of non-memorial 
information might also be critical. In the present study and in Luus and Wells (1994) witnesses 
received non-memorial information almost immediately after making their identifications. If 
witnesses are given enough time to consider and solidify their certainty judgments before 
other information is introduced, the impact of the non-memorial information might be 
reduced. The timing of the introduction of non-memorial information could also be explored 
in fiiture research. 
The ecphoric similarity and confidence estimates that witnesses reported in the present 
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study were influenced by non-memorial information. A witness's belief that he or she has 
identified the guilty person might not be a function of a good memory, but rather a function of 
having been exposed to some form of extra-memorial information. There may be other 
witness perceptions that can be affected by non-memorial information. The Supreme Court 
has suggested that in addition to witness confidence, the trier-of-fact should also consider the 
witness's opportunity to view the culprit, and the degree of attention that the witness paid to 
the culprit at the time of the crime (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). Witnesses who believe that that 
they are "right" may not only indicate a high level of confidence, but also indicate that they 
got a good look at the culprit, and that they pad a high degree of attention. Witnesses might 
reason that if this were not the case, they would not have been able to recognize and identify 
the guilty person. The negative effects of introducing non-memorial information might 
therefore extend beyond witnesses' confidence judgments to other components of their 
testimony. 
Finally, other forms of an ecphoric-similarity question might be tested in the future. 
Although the similarity question used in the present study seemed to be a good candidate 
based on the pilot study, it did not perform particularly well. It is not necessarily the case that 
the difference question used was a poor measure of ecphoric similarity. In the pilot study, 
unlike in the main experiment, witnesses knew that they were being asked questions as part of 
a psychology experiment. The witnesses in the pilot study may have been able to answer the 
similarity question in isolation, without considering their confidence. In the staged crime 
paradigm, witnesses might have been unable to consider the similarity judgment as only a 
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judgment of resemblance, and interpret the measure as a question of how certain they were 
about their identification. In the context of a criminal investigation it might be difiicult for 
\^dtnesses to believe that there could be any purpose to making a simple perceptual judgment. 
The question might be asked more carefully, stressing that the ecphoric measure is a question 
about their perceptions of similarity and not a question about confidence. 
Conclusion 
Asking witnesses about their confidence is intended to be a question about the 
goodness of their memories. High eyewitness confidence can be an indicator of an excellent 
and accurate memory, but it can also be indicative of the witness's belief that the suspect is 
guilty as a function of additional "evidence" that is unrelated to the accuracy of the witness's 
identification decision. It may not be possible for witnesses to determine what factors 
influence their confidence judgments, or to adjust their confidence for those influences. 
The ecphoric similarity judgment was proposed as a possible alternative indicator of 
eyewitness accuracy. In the present study, it appears that witnesses were unable to make pure 
estimates of similarity that were fi'ee from considerations of non-memorial information and 
their own confidence. If ecphoric similarity had been resistant to non-memorial influences, it 
would have been evidence that people are able to provide a reliable estimate of the accuracy 
of their own memories, at least relative to the eyewitness confidence judgment. This could 
have lead to other ways of assessing eyewitness confidence than those currently in use. 
The legal system need not wait, however, for a better indicator of accuracy to be 
found in order to improve the reliability of eyewitness identifications and testimony. There are 
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procedures that can be implemented that would reduce if not eliminate the introduction of 
potentially biasing extra-memorial influences in eyewitness identifications (Wells & Seelau, in 
^ress). First, the person conducting the lineup should be unaware of who the suspect is in the 
lineup. This makes it unlikely that the person conducting the lineup can communicate to the 
witness which person is the suspect, or any potentially incriminating or exonerating evidence 
about the suspect before or after an identification has been made. Second, eyewitness 
confidence measures should be taken immediately after the identification, before any other 
influences are able to affect that judgment. Third, the witness's confidence judgment should be 
recorded at the time of the identification. Thus, any discrepancy between the degree of 
confidence the witness testifies to in court and his or her estimate given at the time of the 
identification can be detected and challenged in court. The need for obtaining a confidence 
measure immediately after a witness has made an identification was made very clear in this 
study, where confidence judgments were affected after only a few seconds had passed. 
The legal system currently ignores not only the weak relation between eyewitness 
confidence and identification accuracy, but it also fails to take measures that might improve 
the utility of confidence as an indicator of accuracy. The fact that the courts accept eyewitness 
confidence as an indicator of accuracy without recognizing other potential sources of 
confidence unrelated to memoiy can lead to unnecessary eyewitness confidence inflation. 
When witnesses base their confidence on information unrelated to their memories, they are 
indirectly increasing the impact of the information (that may be inadmissible) in the 
courtroom. 
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APPENDIX A: CONSENT FORM 
In this study, we are interested in how people evaluate others. If you agree to 
participate, you will be asked to evaluate several individuals based on different types of 
information that will be provided about them. For each person, you will be given a file folder 
containing information on which to base your decision, which may include a photograph, 
responses to questionnaires about that person's beliefs, and demographic information. The 
session will last about an hour. In exchange for your participation you will receive one hour 
of extra credit toward your course grade. 
All of your responses will be anonymous, and be kept completely confidential. The 
experimenter will be available to answer any questions you may have regarding the study. 
There are no known risks to you for participating in this study. However, if at any time you 
feel uncomfortable you may withdraw without loss of research credit for your participation in 
the study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. 
I have read and understand the above information and agree to participate in this 
study. I understand that I may withdraw fi-om the study at any time and still receive credit for 
participation. 
Printed Name Date 
Signature 
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APPENDIX B: ORAL DEBRIEFING 
I would now like to tell you a little bit more about this study. Initially you were told this 
study was concerned Avith evaluating the opinions of other students. However, you were 
never actually asked to evaluate anyone. In fact, this part of the study was not what we were 
really interested in. 
There are some things that I haven't been able to tell you up to this point. In some 
psychological research, telling people the true purpose of the study may lead them to react 
differently than they would otherwise. 
This study is actually a study of eyewitness memory. The theft that you witnessed was not 
an actual theft. It was staged for this experiment, and was designed to be as realistic as 
possible. As you might guess, the DPS ofiBcer is not really with campus security, but is 
actually another experimenter playing that role. Our main objective was to present what 
appeared to be a real theft, and then have you try to identify the thief from a set of photos. 
We couldn't tell you in advance that you were going to witness a theft, as you may have tried 
to pay closer attention to the characteristics of the thief We wanted your reactions to be as 
natural as possible ~ as if you had been a witness to a real crime. 
Before I tell you any more about what we're interested in learning about in this study, I'd 
like you to answer a few more questions. (Participants completed the Final Questionnaire.) 
We are interested in finding better ways of measuring how confident people are in their 
identifications. People's confidence estimates can be affected by a number of things, including 
knowing who other witnesses identify, or information about a suspect's past criminal record. 
Obviously, any information you might have been given in this case was untrue. In fact, you 
were randomly assigned to hear the type of information that you did. Ultimately, we are trying 
to find a measure of confidence that is resistant to these types of information. 
I hope that you can see why we couldn't tell you in advance what was going to happen in 
this study, and I need to ask for your help. It's important that we get people's natural 
reactions to the theft, and that they believe that the theft was real. So I need to ask you not to 
tell anyone about what really happens in this study. If people know what's going on, the 
responses we get from them won't help us at all ~ and it will also make their experience 
unrewarding for them. We really appreciate your participation in this study, and if you have 
any questions please let me know. 
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APPENDIX C: FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Did the Campus Police officer try to influence your decision regarding which person you 
should identify from the photo set? Yes No 
2. If you made an identification, you were asked to indicate how confident you were that you 
had identified the right person. Please list all of the factors that you considered in reaching 
your confidence judgment. Take all the time that you need. 
3 a. Did the Campus Police officer mention that another \satness had identified the same 
person as you? 
Yes No 
3b. If you answered YES to Question 3a, to what degree, if at all, did you base your 
confidence judgment on that information? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Completely 
4a. Did the Campus Police oflficer mention that the person you identified may have been 
involved in a prior theft? Yes No 
4b. If you answered YES to Question 4a, to what degree, if at all, did you base your 
confidence judgment on that information? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Completely 
5. Before you came into the lab today to participate in this study, did you know that you 
would witness a staged theft? Yes No 
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APPENDIX D: PROTOCOL 
Experimenter (E) should be at lab at least ten minutes before the first session. Unlock all 
doors and post the "Do Not Disturb " sign on the outer door. Make sure phone is "plugged 
in Get out consent forms, pencils, etc. Put a blank questionnaire in each cubicle. The 
campus security officer (CS) should be dressed and the thief (T) should be waiting with the 
camera in the inner room. 
Phase I 
E: Meet participants on third floor and take them upstairs to the lab. Seat them in the main 
room. Hand out consent forms; collects consent forms. 
E: "As it said on your consent forms, we are trying to see how your evaluations of a 
person are influenced by your knowledge of that person's opinions and appearance. What we 
are currently doing is having students like you come into the lab and fill out a series of 
questionnaires that measure different opinions and attitudes. While each student is here, we 
have been taking their picture for future use in this study." 
"The first thing we would like to have you do today is fill out a questionnaire so you 
can see what the task is like. Then I'll be giving you a group of questionnaires that other 
people have already filled out — sometimes you may also get a picture of that person ~ and 
you'll be asked to evaluate them on various dimensions. Each of you will be evaluating a 
different set of people." 
"After you are both finished with this part of the study, I'll ask your permission to take 
your picture so that we can also use your answers in the future. It is important that we get a 
large sample of people, and the photos are taken right here, so this part of the study won't 
require any extra time on your part. However, I'll ask for your permission for this only at the 
end of the experiment, once you have seen what is involved." 
"Does anyone have any questions?" (pause) 
E: Try opening the door leading to cubicles. "This door seems to be locked. It must have 
shut when I came to get you. I need to go get the key. I'll be back in just a minute and then 
we can get started." Exit waiting room to the left. 
Thief (A few seconds later) open cubicle door, look around at participants, and exit left with 
the camera in hand. 
E return to find that the door is now open. 
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Phase n 
E: Look around the room with a puzzled expression. 
E: "Oh. Is somebody back there? The door's open now." 
Walk into room and "discover" that the camera is missing. Very flustered, return to the main 
room to find out what happened: 
"Who was it?" "What did he/she look like?" "Did he/she just walkout?" 
"Did he/she say anything?" "Where did he/she go?" 
E: Tell participants to stc  ^put and quickly exit room as if to follow thief Return a few 
seconds later and ask for more information. Apologize to the participants again; have them 
wait while you "call your supervisor 
E: 1) "Eric? This is . Listen... I think someone just stole our camera. I mean... I'm 
not sure how it happened, but I got ready to start a session and the door leading into the back 
was locked. It must have shut when I went downstairs to get the participants. I went to the 
other office to get a key, and when I came back, one of the back doors was open, and the 
camera was gone." 
2) "No, I don't think so... I don't think there's anything else missing... I guess I'm not 
sure about that... Yes, there were people already in here... and they said someone came out of 
the room with the camera... No, it was while I was down the hall..." (Pause in the phone 
conversation as necessary to be convincing that you are really talking to someone.) 
3) "Who do you think it could have been?... I wondered about that... You think it 
could have been one of the people who have already been in the study? I mean... who else 
would know there was a camera in there??" 
4) "Well, they said it was a fe/male..." (Give description as reported by participants, 
asking them more questions as necessary.) 
5) "What do you want me to do? OK... OK... OK... Should I go ahead and finish 
this?... OK, thanks... I'm so sorry about this..." 
E: Hangup. Tell participants: 
"I guess my supervisor is going to handle this. He's calling campus police. But we're 
supposed to go ahead with the study." 
E: Apologize and answers any questions. Separate participants to "begin the study ". 
67 
Participants are given materials and instructions in their separate cubicles. Each participant 
is given a folder. 
£: "The first thing I'm going to have you do before evaluating anyone else is to fill out 
one of these questionnaires so you can become familiar with the types of things we're 
interested in. The directions are on the top. I'll be back in a few minutes. Please wait here, 
even if you finish before I come back. Do you have any questions?" 
Doors should be kept open. 
E: Select appropriate photos for the thief (by condition) and have them ready for Phase III. 
Phase m 
CS knocks on and opens outer door, and has an introductory conversation in the waiting 
room with E. 
CS: "Hi, I'm Officer from the Department of Public Safety." 
E: "That was fast." 
CS: "Our office is right down the street." 
' E: "Here, let me take your coat..." (Pause.) 
CS: "We got a call about a stolen camera. Am I in the right place?" 
"Could I get your name please?" 
"Would you tell me what happened?" 
E: "The camera was taken from one of the rooms back there. I left for just a minute and 
someone must have already been in there... and came out with the camera. The people in this 
study were just sitting out here and saw the whole tlung. They told me about it when I came 
back and found the door open. I tried to go after him/her, but I didn't see anyone." 
CS: "What do you mean? Who are these people?" 
E: "Oh, I'm sorry. We're running a psychology experiment. These people had signed up 
to be in it, but when I was gone for a minute, someone came in and took the camera we had. 
But I have them back there filling out questionnaires anyway. I didn't think you'd come right 
away." 
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CS: "Who has a key to this room?" 
E: "Just my supervisor and myself, as far as I know. But I left it unlocked for a few 
minutes when I went down to get the students for the study, so I guess whoever it was didn't 
really need a key." 
CS: "Okay... What kind of camera was it?" 
E: "It was a Minolta 35 mm. I'm not exactly sure what model it was, but I can find out." 
CS: "Do you have any idea who might have wanted to take the camera?" 
E: "Well, when I called my supervdsor, we were thinking it had to be one of the previous 
students from this study, because no one else knew about the camera. We just use it to take a 
picture of each person at the end of the session. So everyone who has been through here knew 
about it, and actually we've got pictures of all of them... In fact, it must have been one of the 
people that have already been in this study. First of all, there's no one else who could have 
known about the camera ~ Nobody else has been back here except me and my supervisor. 
Not only that, but..." (E speaks so that only CS can hear...) "...so you see it had to be one of 
them." 
CS: "Isn't it possible that someone else from the department may have come in to get the 
camera, or does anyone else work here?" 
E: "No. There's just two of us working on this right now, me and my supervisor, and 
he's the one that called you." 
CS: "All right... Well, you get those pictures. I'm going to talk to them. Why don't you 
close those doors; I should probably talk to them separately." 
E: shut both cubicle doors. After a minute, tell each witness: 
"The campus security ofificer is talking to the other person first. I guess it'll be a few 
minutes before he/she will want to talk to you. If you've got something you can do while 
you're sitting here, why don't you do that?" 
E and CS enter Room A. 
CS to witness (take notes when witness responds): 
"Could I get your name please? And your telephone number, in case we need to get 
back in touch with you?" 
"You saw the person who took a camera out of one of these rooms?" 
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"Can you describe that person for me please?" 
"Can you tell me anything else?... Apparently he/she thirdcs the only people who could 
have known about the camera have already been through here." 
E; "Yes, and we've got pictures of all of them... I pulled out all the ones that are even 
close to how they described her/him..." 
CS: "Let me see those." (Looks through them.) 
"All right. This is a bit unusual, but I'm going to ask that you look at these pictures 
now." (Hcmds-witness stack of photos.) 
"Please identify the person that you saw... Which person is it?" (Write down the 
number chosen.) 
CO-WITNESS CONDITION: 
CS: "The other witness identified the same person." 
EVIDENCE CONDITION: 
CS to E: "What's this person's name? Do you have that information?" 
E looks through list; gives name. 
CS; "You know, I think he/she's been brought in for questioning before... I think it had to 
do with some things that were taken from one of the dorms." 
ORDER OF THESE QUESTIONS VARIES: 
CS: "OK. I just need to ask you a few more questions, just for my information." 
1) "How confident are you that this is the person you saw with the camera, say, on a 
scale firom one to ten, with ten being completely confident?" 
2) "I'd like for you to look carefully at this photo and tell me how difTerent is your 
memory of the person you saw from the person in this picture? Let's say, on a 
scale fi'om one to ten, with one being not at all different, and ten being 
completely diiTerent." 
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CS: "Okay, thanks. That's fine for now." 
E to participant: "Thanks. Why don't you just wait here for a few more minutes. I won't 
make you finish the experiment, but we better make sure the officer is finished before I let you 
go... And I'm still required to debrief you about the experiment anyway. It'll just be a 
minute." 
After both participants have been questioned and CS has left, E escorts them back to the 
waiting room for the debriefing. 
Finishing up: 
1) Debrief 
2) Answer any questions. 
3) Thank them and send them on their way. 
After participants leave, CS gets materials from cubicles. On each response sheet, note: 
- Date, time, condition 
-T,E,CS name 
- ID or photo number, confidence rating, difference (similarity) rating 
- Gender of participant 
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APPENDIX E : ANOVA TABLE 
Amfysis of Variance for Confidence andEcphoric Similarity 
Source (ff SS F 
Between subjects 
Accuracy 1 10.55 2.68 .031 
Information 2 8.17 1.04 .024 
Order 1 7.92 2.01 .023 
Accuracy x Information 2 32.38 4.11* .089 
Accuracy x Order 1 .26 0.06 .001 
Information x Order 2 3.87 0.49 .012 
Accuracy x Information x Order 2 3.79 0.48 .011 
Subject within-group error 84 331.06 
Within subjects 
Question Type (Q) 1 .26 0.17 .002 
Q X Accuracy 1 .01 0.00 .000 
Q X Information 2 .79 0.26 .006 
Q X Order 1 2.30 1.53 .018 
Q X Accuracy x Information 2 5.29 1.76 .040 
Q X Accuracy x Order 1 1.17 .78 .009 
Q X Information x Order 2 8.00 2.67 .060 
Q X Accuracy x Information x Order 2 2.62 0.87 .020 
Q X Subject within-group error 84 126.06 
*p<.Q5 
